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1. Summary of the minor dissertation  
  1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this minor dissertation is to explore the effectiveness of the 
rights that are provided to affected persons of a company that is under 
business rescue, and how these rights can be used by the affected persons to 
ensure that the company is rescued in terms of section 128 (1)(b)(iii) of the 
Companies Act No.71 of 2008 (“the Companies Act”).1  Affected persons 
derive their rights to be involved in the business rescue proceedings from the 
Companies Act. However, some of the rights provided to the affected persons 
afford them with protection, arguably, to such an extent that it can be 
detrimental to the financial status of a company in business rescue. As a result, 
some affected persons end up suffering irreparable financial loss because of 
the language of the provisions in the Act.  
In other instances, the Act gives too much protection to affected persons, such 
as the employees of the company to the detriment of the company.2 The minor 
dissertation explores the manner in which an equilibrium can be reached 
between the protection afforded  by the rights given to the affected persons for 
their benefit in the company while at the same time using those rights to ensure 
that the objectives of business rescue are upheld at all times.     
1.1. Research problem 
The minor dissertation examines the importance of the rights that are provided 
to affected persons in business rescue and how these rights can be used by 
the affected persons to ensure that both the debtor-company and the relevant 
stakeholders are able to survive the proceedings. It appears from the 
provisions of Chapter 6 of the Companies Act that although there are three 
categories of people that are mentioned under the definition of affected 
persons, there are in fact more people who are negatively affected by the 
                                                     
1 Companies Act 2008 s128 (i)(b)(iii). 
2 Companies Act 2008 s144. 
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conduct of the company under business rescue.3 The additional person that is 
negatively affected in this regard is the surety who has stood to make 
repayment of the debts of the company should it fail to do so when called up 
by the creditors. The question of the minor research then turns on whether the 
current definition of ‘affected persons’ as mentioned in section 128 of the 
Companies Act should be expanded to include sureties, and whether the rights 
of the current affected persons should be amended.4 Must the term ‘affected 
persons’ be amended so as to ensure that the persons who are financially 
linked to the company are included in the business rescue proceedings? This 
question will be answered by examining the role that the current affected 
persons play in a company that is under business rescue proceedings. The 
minor dissertation will further examine the extent to which the rights of the 
affected persons assist or hinder the progress of a company under business 
rescue proceedings.  
The need to examine the effectiveness of the rights of the affected person 
arises as a result of the judicial interpretation of section 154, wherein courts 
held different views regarding the position of persons who have stood as 
sureties for the companies that have subsequently been placed under 
business rescue.5 The idea to criticise the statutory definition of affected 
persons came as a result of the conflicting judgments regarding the 
interpretation of section 154 of the Act which is the provision that has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Appeal to exclude the sureties from 
receiving a benefit of the discharge of claims of creditors as concluded 
between the debtor-company and its creditors.6 The rights that are extended 
to the affected persons are critical in ensuring that the business rescue process 
is managed successfully and that the interests of the relevant stakeholders are 
                                                     
3 Chapter 6 of the Companies 2008. 
4 Op cite 1. 
5 Companies Act 2008 s154. 
6 New Port Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v Nedbank Ltd [2014] ZASCA 210. 
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considered fully.7  And the provisions relating to these affected persons should 
be interpreted in accordance with the rules of interpretation so as to avoid 
giving legislation meaningless interpretation. 
Research aim  
 
The aim of the research project is to attempt to criticise and analyse the 
approaches that have been adopted by the courts in interpreting the rights of 
the affected persons and their relationship with the company under business 
rescue proceedings. The research will also provide some suitable alternatives 
that can be adopted into chapter 6 of the Act so as to curb the harshness 
currently set by the precedent of our courts when it comes to the company and 
its relationship with the affected persons. It is argued that the current 
interpretation of section 154 fails to acknowledge that where the debtor and 
the creditor agree to discharge a part of the claim of the creditor, the effect of 
that discharge is that it changes the initial agreement between the creditor and 
debtor, and the suretyship which is ancillary to that debt should also be 
reduced accordingly.8 The interpretation of section 154 has relied upon the 
wording of the section wherein it provides for the discharge to be conducted in 
accordance with a business rescue plan that has been approved by the 
relevant stakeholders.  
However, this interpretation of the section fails to take cognisance of the fact 
that sureties are excluded from participating in the business rescue process 
by virtue of not being included in the definition of ‘affected persons’ under 
section 128.9  The research project further provides a critical analysis of the 
problems that come with the insufficient description of section 128 as far as 
section 154 is concerned.  Section 154 illustrates the issues that come with 
the current definition of affected persons: in that a person, such as a surety, 
who is an integral part of the company, is not considered in the Act and the 
result thereof is that the lack of consideration can render a company 
unsuccessful with its business rescue proceedings.  
                                                     
7 Part C of Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008. 
8 Companies Act 2008 s154. 
9 Op cite 1.  
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Delineations and limitations 
The minor dissertation focuses on the role that affected persons play when the 
company is under business rescue. The paper looks at the challenges that 
each of the affected persons faces and proposes solutions on how these 
issues can be resolved. However, the concepts of business rescue in South 
African jurisprudence is fairly new, although there has been some 
development in this area of law; there are still not enough textbooks that have 
been written about this procedure. As a result, case law and journal articles 
form greater part of the primary resource for this minor dissertation. Save for 
the commentary in Henochsberg, the textbooks that are currently available 
mainly discuss the procedural aspects of business rescue but fail to 
adequately engage with the texts; hence the research consists of mostly cases 
that have been brought before the courts for clarity, the minor dissertation will 
discuss the interpretation thereof in accordance with the rules of 
interpretation.10    
Chapters of the essay 
Chapter 1 of the minor dissertation is an introduction of the concept of business 
rescue as found in Chapter 6 of the Companies Act as well as the description 
of other terms that are relevant to business rescue proceedings as well as the 
research. The chapter also includes the research topic, research question and 
key references that are used throughout the research project.    
Chapter 2 of the minor dissertation describes the rules of interpretation of 
statute that are followed in South African jurisprudence and how these rules 
have been applied in the interpretation of Chapter 6 of the Companies Act. 
Chapter 2 of the minor dissertation further examines the position of 
                                                     
10 PM Meskin et al, Henochsberg on Companies Act 71 of 2008, Vol 1. 
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shareholders and creditors as affected persons of a company under business 
rescue and how courts have attempted to interpreted the rights of these 
affected persons in relation to the company.  
Chapter 3 of the minor dissertation examines the roles that unionised and non-
unionised employees play in rescuing a company. It further considers the 
rights that employees have and how these rights can be utilised in a manner 
that will assist the company in achieving the aims of business rescue. 
Chapter 4 of the minor dissertation focuses on the sureties as persons who 
are financially linked to the company in terms of section 154.11 The chapter 
examines the nature of suretyship agreement and the role that these 
agreements play for affording a company the necessary credit that it needs in 
its survival. This section further examines the role that sureties play once a 
company has been placed under business rescue proceedings. The role of the 
sureties is analysed in relation to section 154 and the interpretation thereof as 
provided for by the courts.12 This chapter further compares the position of 
sureties in relation to business rescue and liquidations proceedings.    
Chapter 5 of the minor dissertation has a conclusion and recommendations as 
to what the writer proposes as the way forward for the dilemma created by the 
research question.  
Key References 
Below are the terminology and concepts that I will be using throughout this 
minor dissertation. The majority of these terms are derived from Chapter 6 of 
the Companies Act.  
Affected persons: means shareholders, creditors, and employees of the 
company represented by a registered trade union and those that are 
unrepresented;13 
                                                     
11 Companies Act 2008 s 154. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Companies Act 200 s 128(1). 
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Business rescue: means the proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation of a 
company that is financially distressed by providing: a temporary supervisor, 
who will restructure the affairs of the company; a temporary moratorium on the 
rights of claimants against the company; a plan that will be developed and 
implemented with an aim to maximise the likelihood of the company continuing 
on a solvent basis or providing a better return for creditors and/or shareholders 
than they would have received in liquidation;14 
Independent creditor: means a person, including an employee, who has a 
claim against the company, and is not related to the company, a director or the 
practitioner, as stipulated in section 2 of the Act;15 
Liquidator: in relation to a company, means the person appointed under 
Chapter 6 as liquidator of the company, and includes any co-liquidator and any 
provisional liquidator so appointed, once a court order placing the company in 
provisional or final liquidation has been granted;16 
Business rescue practitioner: means a person appointed, or people jointly 
appointed in accordance with section 138 of the Companies Act, to oversee a 
company during business rescue proceedings;17 
General moratorium: means the suspension of all legal proceedings and the 
enforcement thereof in relation to any property belonging to the company or 
lawfully in its possession.18 Once a company is in business rescue, people are 
suspended from instituting legal proceedings or enforcing their claims against 
the company. However, the company is not prohibited from instituting legal 
proceedings or enforcing its claims against third parties.19 The moratorium is 
a defense in personam that applies in favour of a company that has been 
placed under business rescue proceedings;20 





18In the matter of Chetty v Hart [2015] ZASCA 112 para 12 the SCA held that the meaning of legal 
proceedings also include arbitration proceedings.  
19 Companies Act 2008 s 133(1). 
20Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) para 18.  
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Binding offer: is an offer that is made by either a creditor or a shareholder to 
another creditor who is against the adoption of a business rescue plan.21 The 
value of the binding offer is calculated as the equivalent of what that creditor 
would have received had the company went in to liquidation proceedings.22 If 
the company in business rescue makes receives more money, the creditor 
who accepted the offer is not allowed to come back and request more money 
as a result thereof; 
PCF: Post commencement funding, is the financial assistance in terms of a 
loan that a company in business rescue borrows from a creditor. The creditor 
who lends PCF is then ranked first in terms of repayment and receives the 
unencumbered assets as security for the advanced PCF; 
Union: means a registered trade union as defined in terms of section 96 of the 
Labour Relations Act  No. 65 of 1995; 
Board: means a board of directors of a company; and 
CIPC: means the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission. 
1.2 Business rescue proceedings 
The research projects focuses on the situation that most companies find them 
in once they have been placed under business rescue proceedings.  It is not 
important for the purpose of the research project to know how these companies 
were placed in business rescue.  However, in order to understand exactly what 
happens when companies are in business rescue proceedings, one needs to 
know and fully comprehend the process through which companies can be 
placed under business rescue. Business rescue is the proceedings to facilitate 
the rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed.23  
                                                     
21 Companies Act 2008 s153(1)(b)(iii). 
22 Ibid. 




A company is financially distressed when it appears to be reasonably unlikely 
that it will be able to pay all of its debts as they become due and payable within 
the immediately ensuing six months or when it appears to be reasonably likely 
that the company will become insolvent within the immediately ensuing six 
months24. In order for a company to qualify for a business rescue, it must show 
that it is not only financially distressed but that there is also a reasonable 
prospect of it being rescued in one of the two ways mentioned above.25   
A company can be placed under business rescue either by a resolution of the 
board or by an application to court made by any of the affected persons.26 
When business rescue proceedings are commenced by way of a resolution, 
the directors ought to ensure that the current and accurate financial status of 
the company is reflected on the papers so as to give the creditors a true sense 
of whether or not the company can be successfully rescued.27  The 
commencement of the proceedings by way of a resolution is onerous on the 
board in that it requires strict compliance with the time limits provided in the 
Act.28 Apart from the fact that the resolution must be properly constituted,29 the 
Act further has other administrative requirements that must strictly be adhered 
to, more specifically in respect of the meetings that must take place with the 
affected persons, respectively.30  
Should the board not comply with all of the relevant requirements as provided 
in the Act, then the affected persons may approach the court for an order 
setting aside the resolution, which will only happen if it is just and equitable to 
do in the eyes of the court.31 Lastly, there is also a limit on the time in which 
an application for the setting aside of the plan may be brought before a court; 
it appeared from the Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Nel case that an 
                                                     
24 Companies Act 2008 s182(1)(f). 
25 Companies Act 2008 s131 (4)(a).  
26 Piet Delport The Companies Act Manual page 142. 
27 African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & others [2015] ZASCA 
69 para 34. 
28 Companies Act 2008 s129. 
29 DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO 2014 (1) SA 103 (KZP) para 16. 
30 However, in the matter of Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Nel and Another NNO 2015 ZASCA it was 
held that non-compliance with the provisions of the Chapter 6 of the Act does not automatically render 
the proceedings a nullity. It merely provides the affected persons with an opportunity to approach the 
court.  
31 Ibid at para 29. 
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application for the setting-aside of the resolution may not be brought after a 
plan has been adopted.32  
The commencement of business rescue by way of a resolution is however 
limited, in that it cannot be initiated once there is an already existing application 
for the liquidation of the company.33 The business rescue proceedings of a 
company that is in liquidation can only be instituted by way of an application 
made by any of the affected persons to the same court that is hearing the 
application for the liquidation of the company.34 Section 131(1) provides for 
any affected person to apply to court at any time to place the company under 
business rescue proceedings.35  It has been held in the SCA case of Richter v 
Absa Bank that business rescue proceedings of a company can be brought 
even after the final liquidation order in respect of that company has been 
granted.36 Apparently this is echoed by section 131(6) of the Act which states 
that a business rescue application in respect of the company stays the 
liquidation proceedings of that company until decided upon by the court.37 The 
court can either grant an order placing the company under business rescue 
proceedings if it is just and equitable to do so or it can dismiss the business 
rescue application and place the company in liquidation proceedings.38  
However, as of current the law is not clear as to how far into the liquidation 
proceedings of the company the affected persons may apply to court to have 
the company placed under business rescue proceedings. It appeared from the 
judgment of Gamble in the Van der Merwe and Others v Zonnekus Mansions 
matter that there exists a limitation, but the limitation on this is also not clear 
as he did not elaborate further on this point.39 At the moment it appears that 
our courts are also waiting on the legislature to amend the Act before making 
definitive judgments. This is to some degree contradictory to the aim of section 
                                                     
32 Ibid at para 29. 
33 Companies Act 2008 131(7).  
34 Sibakhulu Construction (Pty) Limited v Wedgewood Village Golf Country Estate (Pty) Limited.  
35 Companies Act 2008 s 131(1). 
36 Richter v Absa Bank Limited (20181/2014) [2015] ZASCA 100 para 15. 
37 Companies Act 2008 s 131(6).  
38 Companies Act 2008 s131(4)(a). 
39 Van der Merwe and Others v Zonnekus Mansions (Pty) Limited (In liquidation) and others para 57 
 11 
 
7 of the Act, which is to rescue companies that are financially distressed as 
opposed to hopelessly insolvent companies.40  
In a business rescue application that is brought post the liquidation order being 
granted, the affected person bringing such an application is under an obligation 
to place the correct factual basis before the court that indicate that there exists 
a reasonable prospect that the desired outcome of either rescuing the 
company or achieving a higher return for creditors and shareholders exist.41 
The application must be served on all affected persons in order to afford them 
an opportunity to also participate in the hearing of the application.42 Once the 
court has heard the matter, it can rule that, inter alia, on the face of the papers, 
it is satisfied that a case for the commencement of business rescue has been 
met; or that it is just and equitable under the circumstances to order that the 
company commences with business rescue as per section 131(4) of the Act.43 
In Addition thereto, the court must further be satisfied that there is a reasonable 
prospect for rescuing the company.44 Failing which, the court may dismiss the 
application. 
A reasonable prospect of it being rescued 
In the matter of Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm 
Investments 386 Ltd, the court considered the meaning of ‘reasonable 
prospect’ and stated that in considering whether the company has a 
reasonable prospect of being rescued, judges should look at the following 
factors:45  
a) The likely cost of rendering the company able to commence with its 
intended business, or to resume the conduct of its core business; 
                                                     
40 The writer argues that a company which has been declared insolvent is not capable of being rescued 
through business rescue as this is not the correct procedure for it.  Business rescue is designed to 
assist companies that are on the verge of being insolvent and not hopelessly insolvent. When a 
liquidation order has been granted against a company it is because that company is factually insolvent 
and does not pass the solvency and liquidity test as per section 4 of the Act. A clear distinction needs 
to be drawn between companies that fit the threshold of being financially distressed and those that are 
insolvent. The provisions of business rescue were not designed to revive dead companies.  
41 Propspec Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd 2013(1) SA 542 (FB) para12.    
42 Companies Act 2008 s 131(3). 
43 Op cite 29. 
44 Ibid. 




b) the likely availability of the necessary cash resource in order to 
enable the ailing company to meet its day to day expenditure, once 
its trading operations commence or resumed. If a company will be 
reliant on loan capital or other facilities, one would expect to be 
given some concrete indication of the extent thereof and the basis 
or terms upon which it will be available; 
c) The availability of any other necessary resource, such as raw 
materials and human capital; and 
d) The reasons why it is suggested that the proposed business plan 
will have reasonable prospect of success.46 
The aforementioned factors are not exhaustive, but are indicators of some of 
what a business rescue application should contain if it is brought while the 
company is undergoing a liquidation or if it is brought by some of the affected 
persons.47 Some affected persons, such as the creditors and employees who 
do not normally have the inside financial information that the management 
team and shareholders of a company have might not be able to include this in 
their application for a business rescue.  
To prepare a thorough schedule detailing the information regarding the; likely 
cost of rendering the company able to commence with the rescue;  availability 
of PCF to sustain the company while under business rescue; and suggestion 
as to why the company is most likely to be rescued under the proposed 
schedule will prove that the application is made in good faith.48 Also, providing 
the aforementioned information in an application will put the court in a better 
position to objectively ascertain whether or not the company has reasonable 
prospects of being rescued.49  After realizing that the aforesaid steps can be 
onerous on certain applicants, the court held that each case should be 
considered on its own merits and without applying any of the abovementioned 
factors in a rigid manner.50  
Once an order placing the company in business rescue has been granted, an 
interim business rescue practitioner will be appointed. The functions of a 
                                                     
46 Ibid 17. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid at para 24. 
50 Ibid at para 30. 
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practitioner includes, inter alia, the assessment of whether the company has a 
reasonable prospect of success and preparing the business rescue plan.51 
Whereafter, the status of the interim practitioner will be confirmed at the first 
meeting of creditors after they have voted.52 In terms of the Companies Act, 
business rescue is supposed to be a very quick process that is supposed to 
last for approximately 3 months.53 However, the writer is aware of a company 
that has been under business rescue proceedings for over 4 years.54   
The purpose of a business rescue plan    
The business rescue plan provides all stakeholders with the necessary 
information to make the decision regarding the affairs of the company and how 
they should be managed going forward.55 The business rescue plan must 
contain the factual information regarding the basis on which the business 
rescue application was sought and that it must state that business rescue is 
sought on genuine grounds and that it is not being used as a subversive 
exercise to enable the company to avoid its creditors.56 The information 
provided to the stakeholders must at least include a list of the assets of the 
company and the securities held in respect of each of those assets.57  
Section 150(2)(c)(i) of the Companies Act requires the plan to include a 
statement of the conditions that must be fulfilled for the plan to come into 
operation and be fully implemented.58 In terms of section 150(5) the plan must 
be published within 25 days of the appointment of the practitioner.59 However, 
the practitioner’s failure to publish the plan within the stipulated time does not 
terminate the business rescue proceedings, as extension dates can be sought 
from creditors.60 
                                                     
51 Companies Act 2008 s140. 
52 Tshepo Mongalo “Modern Company Law for a competitive South African Economy” page 381. 
53 Companies Act 2008 s 132(3). 
54 LGI Properties Rose (Pty) Limited (in business rescue) this company has been in business rescue 
since 26 February 2013 and continues to be in business rescue.  
55 Companies Act 2008 s131(4). 
56 Resource Washing (Pty) Ltd v Zululand Coal Reclaimers (Pty) Limited and Others [2015] ZAKZPHC 
31. 
57 Companies Act 2008 s 150(2)(a).  
58 Ibid.  
59 Companies Act 2008 s 150(5). 




As part of the conditions of a business rescue plan, most business rescue 
practitioners now include a condition that states that the repayment of certain 
debts to creditors and of compromises that need to be made with certain 
creditors must be done in the presence of sureties.61 However, it is my 
understanding that few of the plans published ever consider the sureties who 
soon turn into prospective creditors of the company as a result of having to pay 
the company’s creditors on behalf of the company by virtue of the suretyship 
agreements. This is because the inclusion of the sureties in a plan is not a 
legal requirement in terms of any provision of the Act.62 Instead what ends up 
happening in most instances, is that the plans only provide information relating 
to the creditors that are currently known to the company and not contingent 
creditors such as the sureties.63  
The role of a business rescue practitioner  
When a company commences business rescue through filing a resolution it 
must nominate its chosen practitioner. However, if business rescue 
commences by way of a court application, then either the application or the 
court will appoint a practitioner who will assist the company in its rehabilitation 
process. In terms of section 138 of the Act, a practitioner is someone that is a 
member in good standing of a legal, accounting or business management 
profession accredited by the commission.64  
In the matter of Griessel v Lizemore, Spilg, J held that a practitioner must be 
independent and not be related to any of the company’s directors.65 The 
practitioner must show that he is capable of coming to decisions in his own 
mind without the influence of any of the directors of the company.66 The 
practitioner is called to assist the company and look out for the interests of the 
affected persons and not to align himself with the interest of one director over 
those of the entire group of affected persons.67   
                                                     
61 Companies Act 2008 s 154. 
62 Companies Act 2008 s 133(2). 
63 Absa Bank Limited v Golden Dividend 339 (Pty) Limited and Others 2015 (5) SA 272 (GP) page 305. 
64 Companies Act 2008 s138. 





A practitioner has a duty to prepare the business rescue plan and steer the 
company into a direction that will either render it a solvent company or provide 
a better return for creditors and or shareholders than it would in liquidation.68 
In preparing the plan, the practitioner must conduct his own investigations into 
the affairs of the company.69 As a person who is in charge of the company, the 
practitioner is also expected to mediate or investigate any concerns that the 
employees might have regarding the status of their employment and 
contracts.70 In ensuring that the company runs efficiently under the control of 
the practitioner, the practitioner may delegate some of his powers to the board 
of directors.71 However, such a delegation should not be absolute to such an 
extent that the practitioner is unaware of what is happening in the company.72  
Once the practitioner has investigated the affairs of the company and prepared 
the plan, he must convene a meeting where the affected persons will vote 
either in favour of the plan or propose that the plan be amended.73 If the plan 
is approved, then the practitioner will work in accordance with it.74 However, if 
there are affected persons such as creditors who are opposing the plan, the 
practitioner can apply to court to force these disgruntled creditors or 
employees to accept the offer.75 Also, the practitioner can request that one of 
the affected persons proposes a binding offer to the disgruntled affected 
person.76 Although, the binding offer may be rejected, this can form the basis 
for a practitioner to approach the court with his independent legal advisers and 
challenge the rejection of the binding offer by the disgruntled affected person.77  
Where the practitioner is found to have acted in contravention of his powers 
as provided by the Act and in a manner that puts the company in a far worse 
off position, he can be removed by any of the affected persons.78 The removal 
of the practitioner can only be done through an application to the court stating 
                                                     
68 Companies Act 2008 s 140(1)(d)(i).  
69 Companies Act 2008 s 141(1).  
70 Griessel v Lizemore at para 64. 
71 Murgatroyd v Van den Heever NO and Others [2014] 4 All SA 89 (GJ) at para 16. 
72 Companies Act 2008 s 142. 
73 Companies Act 2008 s 140. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Companies Act 2008 s 153(7). 
76 Companies Act 2008 s 153(1)(b)(ii). 
77 Companies Act 2008 s 153(7). 
78 Companies Act 2008 s 139(1).  
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full reasons as to why the practitioner should be removed from his position.79 
However, in many instances where the practitioner has acted negligently in 
exercising his duties as a guardian of the company, the courts have awarded 
courts against the practitioner in his personal capacity and not ex officio.80 
As will be shown more fully in the following chapters, the success of a company 
that is under business rescue depends on the use of the rights provided to the 
affected persons. It also depends on the detail of the plan provided to the 
affected persons by the practitioner. To the extent that the rights of the affected 
persons are not drafted clearly in the Act, this becomes problematic since the 
affected persons end up not being able to fully assist the company undergoing 
business rescue through effective use their rights.
                                                     
79 Companies Act 2008 section 139; See also Lazenby v Lazenby Vervoer VV and Others [2014] 
ZANWHC 41 at para 25. 
80 Ibid.  
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Chapter 2  
2. Rules of interpretation of legislation 
This chapter, explores how our courts have interpreted the provisions of 
chapter 6 of the Companies Act more particularly the provision relating to the 
rights of shareholders and creditors as affected persons.  
The chapter starts by discussing the rules of interpretation as found in South 
African jurisprudence and then apply these rules in the interpretation of the 
rights of the affected persons as provide for in terms of chapter 6 of the Act. 
The analysis of the provisions of chapter 6 of the Act is aimed at showing the 
difficulties that exists with the current interpretation of the provisions and how 
this has hindered the progress of companies that are under business rescue.   
In terms of South African jurisprudential principles of interpretation, there are 
rules of construction which form part of the common law. These rules are there 
to assist the courts when interpreting legislation by looking at the purpose of 
the legislation and the intention of the legislature which drafted the legislation. 
It appears from case law that some provisions of the chapter 6 of the Act are 
shoddily drafted and that some of them are not even capable of being 
interpreted clearly without creating new legal problems thereof.81  
2.1 The literal approach of interpreting legislation 
In terms of the legislation, the interpreter should focus on the literal and 
grammatical meaning of the legislative provision to be interpreted.82 
Essentially, the interpreter picks up a dictionary and looks up the word needing 
to be interpreted.83  In this regard, the interpretation process entails that the 
interpreter must look at the plain meaning of the words; whatever meaning the 
words carry, it is this meaning which is assigned to them. However, should the 
                                                     
81 African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & others [2015] 
ZASCA 69 para 43. 
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plain meaning of the words be ambiguous, vague or misleading and the 
application of this would lead to absurdity then, under these circumstances, 
the court may deviate from using the ordinary meaning of the words.84  
Where the meaning of the provision is unclear and/or ambiguous, the court 
can then use the legislation in its entirety and other provisions to draw from 
there what the meaning of the provision in issue could be.85 However, when 
inferring the meaning of the provisions from the surrounding sections, the court 
must apply a strict meaning to that provision in question.86 If this too leads to 
absurdity, then the court needs to refer to common law which formed the basis 
of that act and how it developed prior to the enactment of the legislation.87  
In the matter of Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 
the court held that  
‘Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used 
in a document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or 
contract, having regard to the context provided by reading the particular 
provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the 
circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence.  
Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be given to 
the language used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and 
syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the apparent 
purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those 
responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is 
possible each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these 
factors. The process is objective, not subjective. A sensible meaning is 
to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results 
or undermines the apparent purpose of the document.  
Judges must be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute 
what they regard as reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words 
actually used. To do so in regard to a statute or statutory instrument is 
to cross the divide between interpretation and legislation; in a 
contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties other than the 
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one they in fact made. The “inevitable point of departure is the 
language of the provision itself”, read in context and having regard to 
the purpose of the provision and the background to the preparation and 
production of the document.’88 
 
In the aforesaid matter of Endumeni Municipality, the judge cautions courts 
from attributing meaning to provisions of legislation where the meaning of such 
does not clearly follow from the legislation as a whole. The act of interpreting 
legislation is a critical one as it requires a judge to interpret a provision without 
usurping the powers of the legislature by creating something totally different 
from the one intended by the legislature.89  
As will be seen from the cases discussed below, there are instances when 
judges have interpreted the provisions of the Companies Act in a manner that 
strays away from the traditionally known principles of common law. The effect 
of this interpretation is that it creates a confusion as to the application of the 
law and it puts an onerous burden on the persons that are affiliated with the 
company. An example of this is illustrated by the interpretation of section 154 
of the Companies Act as given by the different courts that have considered this 
provision wherein the courts have given different judgments regarding the 
status of sureties and their liability to the creditors of the company. Section 154 
is discussed in chapter 4 hereof.  
The rule of interpretation or legislation using the aforementioned approach was 
first discussed in the matter of Sussex Peerage,90 where the court held that: 
 “The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they 
should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which 
passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise 
and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound 
those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves 
alone do, in such case; best declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if 
any doubt arises from the terms employed by the Legislature, it has 
always been held a safe mean of collecting the intention to call in aid 
the ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to 
                                                     
88 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2013] ZASCA 13; 2012 (4) 
SA 593 (SCA); [2012] 2All SA 262 9SCA para [18]. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Sussex Peerage Case [1844] 11 Clark and Finnelly 85, 8 ER 1034 at 1. 
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the preamble, which, according to Chief Justice Dyer is "a key to open 
the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they intend 
to redress.’’ 
 
It is argued that the literal approach has inflexibility which places a particular 
strain on the legislation in that it requires the legislature to make law which 
provides for all eventualities.  Further, the interpreter is not allowed to interfere 
with the legislation and is restricted to the body of the text. It is argued that the 
literal interpretation section 154 leads to ambiguity and that it needs to be 
redrafted so as to provide meaningful rights to the creditors, sureties and 
companies as mentioned thereat. As will be seen in chapter 4 hereof, our 
courts have tried to attribute meaning to the wording of section 154; however, 
this exercise has proven to be even more confusing than what might have 
been intended. It appears from the different cases that in trying to interpret the 
provision, our courts have actually interfered with the legislation and extended 
it beyond the meaning intended by the legislature.   
Arguably, the use of the literal approach in the interpretation of legislation can 
sometimes have unintended consequences which the legislature did not 
foresee.91 As a result, the use of the literal approach often leads to the 
legislation becoming ineffective. Similarly, the inability of the courts to use 
other external aids in interpreting the legislation while using the literal approach 
can also lead to a misinterpretation of the legislature’s intention regarding the 
provision. It is submitted that by solely interpreting section 154 based on the 
ordinary meaning of the words without looking at other provisions of chapter 6 
of the Act or the Act in its entirety. There is a high probability that the 
interpretation, in isolation, will lead to a completely different and possibly 
unintended meaning of the provision.  
The interpretation might even lead to the provision being incongruent with 
other provisions of the Act. More often than not, provisions are capable of 
having more than one interpretation and meaning. This then leaves the 
legislature’s intention of the legislature at the mercy of our courts in that the 
interpretation of the provision is left to the courts to give it meaning as they 




deem fit. However, our courts can come to different conclusions about a 
provision and depending on the number of justices believing a certain way that 
provision will then be given the meaning chosen by the majority of the justices. 
In South Africa even this interpretation cannot, with certainty, be said to be the 
only correct one unless it has been tried and tested before the Constitutional 
Court, which is the highest court of the land.92  
In South African jurisdiction legislation is interpreted through the use of the 
literal meaning unless such interpretation leads to absurdity. However, with the 
Constitution being the supreme law of the land, the rules of interpretation have 
to some degree changed in that the interpretation of any legislation must now 
follow the spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights.93  
2.2 The purposive approach of interpreting legislation 
In interpreting the provisions that define the roles and rights of affected 
persons, it is necessary for courts to consider the Bill of Rights during that 
exercise.94 In South African jurisprudence interpretation of legislation now 
starts from the Constitution and flows to the other approaches.95 In the 
Constitutional Court matter of Bato Star, Ngcobo J held that the interpretation 
of legislation must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, 
and that the interpretation of any legislation must always be aimed at 
advancing the values enshrined in the Bill of Rights, such as equality.96  
Company restructuring procedures have previously been dominated by 
creditor-friendly legislation such as the Insolvency Act97 which provide for the 
liquidation procedure for insolvent businesses and the 1973 Companies Act98 
which provided for the judicial management of companies that were unhealthily 
                                                     
92 The Consitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s7. 
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95 Op cite 93 at s2. 
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trading.  Prior to the enactment of the Companies Act in 2008, there was no 
legislation in the South African jurisprudence that was aimed at advancing the 
interests of other company stakeholders other than the creditors.99 Chapter 6 
of the Companies Act tries to redress the inequality that resulted from the 
previous business restructuring procedures.  
 However, the provisions of chapter 6 of the Companies Act are not always 
clear in the manner in which they have been drafted. As a result, the courts 
have had to interpret them in order to give them a coherent legal meaning. In 
order to be able to interpret legislation in a manner that follows the spirit and 
purpose of the Bill of Rights, it is crucial that when the courts interpret the 
Companies Act they do so by following the purposes of the Act as listed in 
section 7 thereof.100 The purposes of the Companies Act that are relevant to 
the business rescue provisions are the following:  
7 Purposes of Act 
“The purposes of this Act are to- 
(a) promote compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided 
for in the Constitution, in the application of company law; 
(b) promote the development of the South African economy 
by- 
(i) encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise 
efficiency; 
(ii) creating flexibility and simplicity in the formation 
and maintenance of companies; and 
(iii) encouraging transparency and high standards 
of corporate governance as appropriate, given the 
significant role of enterprises within the social and 
economic life of the nation; 
(d) reaffirm the concept of the company as a means of 
achieving economic and social benefits; and 
(k) provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of 
financially distressed companies, in a manner that balances 
the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders.” 
                                                     
99 Richard S Bradstreet ‘The Leak in the Chapter 6 Lifeboat: Inadequate Regulation of 
Business Rescue Practitioners May adversely Affect the Lenders’ Willingness and the 
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When the provisions of the chapter 6 are interpreted, the courts have 
a constitutional obligation to ensure that the interpretation thereof is 
aimed at the promotion of the purposes of the Act as 
aforementioned.101 The interpretation of legislation using the purpose 
thereof ensures that the meaning attributed to the provisions is not 
too far off from the intention of the legislature and that it follows the 
Constitution as the supreme law of the land.102 
In the circumstances, the provisions of section 128 which define the 
term ‘affected persons’ will be considered fully below in light of the 
purposes stipulated above. Further, the rights afforded to these 
affected persons in terms of the provisions under chapter 6 of the 
Companies Act will also be examined as to whether or not they 
advance the purposes of business rescue as supported by section 
7(k).103  
2.3 The interpretation of the rights and role of shareholders in business rescue 
proceedings 
As indicated above, the definition of affected persons in the Act includes 
shareholders and as such, shareholders are given rights to participate during 
the business rescue proceedings. Below is an analysis with regard to the 
effectiveness of the rights given shareholders in achieving the primary goal of 
business rescue, being the rescuing of a company into a solvent position 
where it is able to trade without the need of a practitioner.  
In terms of s128(1)(a)(i) of the Act, a person who is a shareholder in a company 
has a right to participate in the business rescue proceedings of that company 
irrespective of whether that person’s shareholding is disputed or not. In terms 
of the section 1 of the Act, a shareholder is the holder of a share issued by a 
company and who is entered as such in the certificate register. The ordinary 
meaning of the word ‘shareholder’ is what entitles that individual, as an 
affected person to participate in the business rescue proceedings of the 
company. In the matter of Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm 
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Bothasfontein, where a shareholding of one of the shareholders of the 
company was contested, Brand JA of the SCA held that although the 
entitlement of one of the shareholders was disputed, the shareholder qualified 
to be an affected person in terms of section 128 of the Act.104 The literal 
approach taken by Brand JA is consistent with the definition of shareholder 
which is found in section 1 of the Companies Act, in that a shareholder qualifies 
in terms of section 128 by simply being registered as such. There is no need 
for the exact shareholding to be known.105  
The Act does not seek to give participation rights to the shareholders according 
to the classes of shares they hold. All shareholders are given equal rights in 
participating in the business rescue proceedings of the company. Similarly, 
business rescue proceedings do not alter the classification of shares in the 
company and the position of the shareholders.106 It merely works with the same 
share structure that was there prior to the commencement of the business 
rescue proceedings. The share structure can only be altered on two grounds:  
if the court directs that the shares be altered; and in an approved business 
rescue plan approved by shareholders, creditors and the other relevant 
stakeholders.107 The share structure can only be altered if the alteration will be 
to the benefit of the company in that it will be able to achieve one of the two 
aims of business rescue.  
Affected persons have a right to participate in the business rescue proceedings 
of the company irrespective of whether the business rescue proceedings were 
instituted through the filing of a resolution by the board of the company, as 
mentioned in section 129108 of the Act or through an application made by one 
                                                     
104 Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd (609/2012) [2013] 
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107 Companies Act 2008 section 137(1) provides that during business rescue proceedings and alteration 
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business rescue plan. 
108 Companies Act 2008 s129 stipulates that subject to subsection (2)(a), the board of a company may 
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of the affected persons in terms of section 131(1) of the Act.109 The 
participation of affected persons in the business rescue proceedings is 
regulated by part C of chapter 6 of the Act. Accordingly, affected persons not 
only have a right to institute the proceedings but they also have the rights to: 
apply to court to have the business rescue proceedings110 and the appointment 
of a business rescue practitioner set aside, as well as the right to approach the 
court to set aside the plan.111 
Further, section 146, a provision under part C of Chapter 6 of the Act, provides 
for the participation in business rescue proceedings by the holders of securities 
in the company. Section 146 provides for each holder of the issued security of 
the company to be notified of the court proceedings regarding business rescue 
and to formally participate in the business rescue proceedings as well as to 
vote to approve or reject a proposed business rescue plan.  
The enactment of these provisions in the Act serves an essential role in the 
business rescue proceedings of the company as they provide the shareholders 
who may not know the exact situation of the company, with an undisputed right 
to know about the financial status which the company finds itself. The right of 
shareholders to participate in the process of regulating the company’s future 
financial planning. Most large businesses have shareholders residing in 
different parts of the world and for the Act to prescribe that the shareholders 
be notified about the business rescue proceedings of the company serve a 
good cause as shareholders are mainly the persons who invest capital and 
funds into the running of the company.  
However, it appears from section 146(d) of the Act that the shareholders are 
only allowed to vote to approve or reject the plan if it contemplates altering the 
classes of shares associated with those shareholders. It is argued that this 
limits the application of section 128 in that the participation by shareholders is 
restricted to those who are going to be affected by the plan.  
                                                     
109 Unless a company has adopted a resolution contemplated in section 129, an affected person may 
apply to a court at any time for an order placing the company under and commencing business rescue 
proceedings. 
110 Companies Act 2008 s 130(1)(a). 
111 African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & others [2015] ZASCA 
69 para 54. 
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Instead of allowing shareholders to participate in voting for the business rescue 
plan, it requires only the shareholders whose shareholding is going to be 
altered only, and not all shareholders as initially envisaged by section 128.112 
Loubser argues that since only those shareholders whose rights will be directly 
affected by the plan may attend the meeting, it is misleading to phrase this 
provision as if each shareholder would be entitled to make such a proposal as 
not all of them are provided with the right to participate in the approval of the 
plan.113  
Secondly, the right to propose an alternative plan is limited to exactly that; to 
propose an alternative plan. It remains the sole right of creditors to vote on the 
proposal. If the creditors have voted in favour of the original plan, they will 
simply reject the proposal for an alternative plan put forward by a shareholder. 
In this regard, the reality is that this provision does not provide the 
shareholders with the rights necessary to have a meaningful impact in the 
implementation of the plan.114 It is not clear why the legislature would choose 
to only grant shareholders with the rights to propose amendments and not vote 
for a plan. In this regard, it is argue that a company with a fewer creditors would 
be subjected to the will of those creditors even if their claims will not be 
significantly affected by the business rescue. This appears to put more power 
in the hands of creditors than is necessary.  
Similarly, the shareholders should also be given a right to vote on the plan and 
not to merely propose amendments. I submit that it could not have been the 
intention of the legislature to exclude innocent shareholders from voting on a 
plan regarding the future conduct of their company.  
In the matter of Sibakhulu Construction (Pty) Limited v Wedgewood Village 
Golf Country Estate (Pty) Limited, wherein during an application for the 
liquidation of the respondent at the Western Cape High Court, the applicant 
discovered that certain creditors had instituted business rescue proceedings 
in the High Court of Port Elizabeth. The creditors in the application instituted 
therein were permitted to intervene in the litigation instituted at the Western 
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Cape High Court. In terms of the litigation that took place at the Western Cape 
High Court, the judge had to determine, inter alia, which ‘court’ between the 
two courts mentioned above had jurisdiction to hear the application to institute 
business rescue proceedings in respect of the respondent. In coming to the 
decision, Binns-Ward J held that the 
 “questions of interpretation of the 2008 Companies Act must be 
undertaken with the provisions of ss5 and 7 in mind. In particular, s 5(1) 
provides that the Act must be interpreted to give effect to the purposes 
set forth in s7. In determining the effect of s23 of the Act on the question 
of a court's jurisdiction it seems to me that the provisions of s 7(k) and 
(I) have a bearing… I consider that it would give effect to the purposes 
set out in s7(k) and (I) to interpret s23 of the Act to the effect that a 
company can reside only at the place of its registered office (which, as 
mentioned, must also be the place of its only or principal office).” 115 
The result would be that there would in respect of every company be only a 
single court in South Africa with jurisdiction in respect of winding-up and 
business rescue matters. 
2.4 The interpretation of the rights and role of creditors as affected person  
Role of a creditor in business rescue proceedings 
Section 128(1) of the Companies Act lists creditors as affected persons of a 
company for the purposes of business rescue. In terms of section 131(1) of 
the Act each creditor, as an affected person, has the right to apply to court, at 
any time, for an order placing the company under supervision and 
commencing the business rescue proceedings. In addition to being given the 
right to commence the proceedings, creditors are also afforded a number of 
other rights which they can use during the proceedings. However, some rights 
of creditors are limited by the moratorium that is triggered by the 
commencement of the business rescue proceedings.  
The effect of the moratorium applies to all creditors including the creditor who 
has brought the application. This was confirmed in Nkhoma DT & 4 Others v 
Zonnekus Mansion (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation), CSARS & Standard Bank of SA 
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Ltd, wherein the applicants lodged a new business rescue application while 
another business rescue application was still before the court.116  Weinkove 
A.J stated that the latter business rescue application was a nullity as the first 
had not been disposed of and that ‘while a business rescue application is in 
extant, another application cannot be brought’.117 Further, the moratorium 
suspends all legal proceedings that the creditors might have already initiated, 
and any judgment or ruling that is made during this period is unenforceable.  
On the other hand, however, once the business rescue proceedings have 
commenced, creditors are given a huge role in which to influence the direction 
that the company takes by making proposals on how the business rescue plan 
can be amended and by voting in favour or against the proposed plan. A 
business rescue plan cannot succeed without the approval of at least 75% of 
independent creditors present at the time the plan is being voted for. It is crucial 
for the creditors of the company to be involved in the business rescue 
proceedings and participate in the voting process and in the process of 
amending the plan. A company that has the backing of its creditors is most 
likely to succeed in its rescue or to achieve a greater return for the creditors.  
Most companies that get rescued through the business rescue process do so 
with the assistance and corporation of creditors. Without creditors taking 
compromises or reductions on their claims, most companies would not survive 
business rescue but would remain insolvent. Creditors that cooperate with the 
companies end up taking a lesser amount from the company than what they 
are owed. The change in the amounts repaid to creditors can, to some extent, 
be seen as a catalyst that changes the nature of the contract between the 
creditors and the company. Dr Levenstein warns that the acceptance of such 
debt compromise can result in a perceived erosion of contractual relationship 
between the lenders and the debtor companies as shown in chapter 4.118   
The contractual relationship between the creditor and the company does not 
change; however, the obligations of the company in terms of the contract are 
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altered and to some extent even abandoned so as to provide the company with 
some breathing space. Unless otherwise stated in the business rescue plan, 
the contractual obligations of the company to the creditors are suspended only 
for the duration of the business rescue proceedings and not entirely 
extinguished.119 If the business rescue proceedings terminate due to the non-
fulfilment or the company is liquidated, then the company’s contractual 
obligations are resurrected and it becomes liable to its creditors in full.  That 
way the company cannot use business rescue as a tool to evade creditors and 
avoid performing contractual obligations when they become too onerous to 
perform.120  
Balancing the rights of creditors and those of the debtor-company 
There are instances where a company reaches a compromise with the 
creditors in a manner that freezes the claims of creditors as at the date of the 
commencement of business rescue proceedings. In this way, the creditors’ 
claims against the company do not accrue interest whilst the company in under 
business rescue.121 The company only becomes liable to the creditors for the 
amount that was outstanding as of the date of commencing with the business 
rescue proceedings and nothing more. The creditors take a compromise in 
their claim as this is sometimes perceived to be better than what they could 
possibly receive should the company be liquidated. The looming threat of 
receiving less in liquidation proceedings than in business rescue proceedings 
is always a useful tool in the company’s hands when negotiating during 
business rescue proceedings.122  
Although the company might argue that creditors will receive a better return in 
business rescue than they would in a liquidation, the result of that argument 
has “negative repercussions on the traditional binding force of contracts”123 
and the economy. However, as business rescue aims to save jobs and ensure 
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that there is prolonged employment, which is better than in liquidation, more 
creditors are more likely to take that instead of liquidation. Also, when creditors 
know that they are going to receive more funds from the business rescue than 
from the immediate liquidation of the company, creditors are likely to support 
that business rescue.  
Moreover, in liquidation creditors are ranked in an order from secured 
creditors, unsecured creditors, preferred creditors and lastly concurrent 
creditors.124 In most liquidation proceedings only the secured creditors receive 
full payment of their claims.125 The remaining creditors stand to receive a few 
cents in a rand, if any. When comparing this situation to that in a business 
rescue proceedings where all creditors, secured and concurrent creditors 
included, all stand to receive some form of payment in respect of their claims, 
it is not difficult to see why the option of business rescue might be preferred 
and accepted by most creditors as it guarantees them payment of some of 
their claims irrespective of their ranking as opposed to liquidation where 
concurrent creditors are at risk of not receiving any payment whatsoever.126 All 
the more, it would be prudent we ensured that the process is a success given 
the possible knock-on consequences. Once a business rescue plan has been 
approved and is being implemented, creditors lose their rights to enforce their 
claims against the company for the remaining of the debts.  
The aforesaid protection provided to the company provides it with the much 
needed breathing space from the claims and judgments that creditors could 
potentially take against the company. The protection of the company against 
creditors is further reinforced by section 152(4) which states that a plan that 
has been adopted is binding on the company, and on each of the creditors of 
the company and every holder of the company’s securities, whether or not 
such a person was: present at the meeting, voted in favour of the adoption of 
the plan, or had approved their claims against the company.127 Also, a creditor 
who unreasonably opposes the adoption of a plan can, upon a court 
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application by a practitioner, be declared a hostile creditor and be removed 
from the voting process and the proceedings of the company.128     
Maintaining equilibrium between the interests of creditors and debtor-
companies is difficult especially in an economic system like South Africa. Our 
legislation always has to take into account the political climate in which South 
Africans live and try to adjust the injustices of the past. This means that in 
some instances creditors, who in the normal course of business would 
liquidate companies, find themselves in situations where they have to 
cooperate with the company and the practitioner in business rescue. Although 
equilibrium is not always reached, the Act does to an extent succeed in 
providing financially distressed companies with a way out of trouble while 
simultaneously providing reasonably efficient means to providing creditors with 
a better return for their claims.  
However, the provisions of the Act that provide the creditors with the rights to 
vote in favour of the plan or reject same if it is not what they want, can be seen 
as the provisions that attempt to achieve the equilibrium. When a moratorium 
is placed on all legal proceedings against a company under business rescue, 
creditors are deprived of taking action to recover their claims against the 
company. However, when the Act provides for creditors to participate in the 
voting of the plan, it gives them the right to regulate how the company should 
deal with their claims and this restores the power that is lost by the application 
of the moratorium.  
Although the preparation of the plan is always conducted by the practitioner, 
the plan will not succeed in its approval or implementation if the creditors do 
not agree with it. In my view Rushworth is correct when he states that business 
rescue is intended to provide a reasonable balance between the interests of 
the debtor company, which is given the opportunity to prepare a rescue plan 
with some protection from action by creditors, and the creditors themselves 
who have a right to vote on the plan.129 
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The creditors’ rights to vote against the plan are not absolute. As any creditor’s 
vote can be overridden by a court if it appears that the creditor merely voted 
against the plan because it did not cater for the repayment of the creditor’s 
claim to the satisfaction of that creditor. A practitioner is given a right to apply 
to court to set-aside the vote of that creditor. Also, another shareholder can 
choose to buy that creditor’s claim at a price equivalent to what the creditor 
would have received had the company been liquidated. Further, creditors are 
also prohibited from enforcing their claims or instituting legal proceedings 
against the company while it is in business rescue. A creditor that wishes to 
proceed with legal actions against the company must first seek the approval of 
the practitioner or of the court.  
Another way in which creditors assist companies is through the provision of 
post commencement funding (“PCF”) once the company has commenced with 
the proceedings. The provision of PCF ensures that the company is able to 
pay its immediate needs and is able to pay salaries of its employees and the 
salary of the practitioner. However, the provision of PCF is not mandatory and 
if the company is relying solely on creditors providing it with PCF in order for it 
to be rescued, then the courts can render the business rescue proceedings a 
sham and place the company in liquidation.  
From the above paragraphs it is has been noted that the Act currently provides 
some shareholders with the rights to participate in the discussions regarding 
the plan while other shareholders are not involved at all. It is not clear why the 
legislature would want shareholders to be involved only in proposing the 
amendments of the plan if they are not going to be voting on it. In this regard, 
I recommend that the legislation be amended to provide shareholders with a 
right to participate in the voting process of the plan.  
In respect of creditors, I am of the view that the interpretation of the rights of 
creditors currently shows the intention of the legislature in that the power that 
is granted to creditors in the liquidation proceedings is removed in the business 
rescue proceedings. In business rescue the power is shifted to the debtor-
company by the application of the moratorium and is only counter-balanced by 




3. The critical role of employees in business rescue 
3.1 The rights and role of the employees as affected persons 
This chapter examines and analyses the role that employees play in assisting 
a company that has been placed under business rescue. As will be seen 
below, one of the main reasons for the inclusion of the business rescue chapter 
in the Companies Act was to provide for a company restructuring mechanism 
that does not result in the loss of employment and which is aligned with our 
employment laws.  
Liquidation, which is one of the restructuring mechanisms that creditors prefer, 
however, results in the loss of employment for most people and  has a negative 
effect on the economy of the country.130 Liquidations had a negative impact on 
the employees of the company in that where companies were not being bought 
as a going concern, the employees had to be retrenched and were left with 
nothing but a preferent claim in the liquidation.131 Fewer companies were sold 
as a going-concern and the negative results thereof rose in exponential 
figures.132 
The claim of employees would always be paid out of the residue of the estate, 
after the secured creditors and South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) had 
been paid. Companies that had been liquidated seldom had any residue and 
this meant that the employees of that company would not only lose their jobs, 
but would also not receive any payment due to them as part of their severance 
pay.133 As a result, the legislature included provisions within the business 
rescue chapter with an aim of providing employees with better protection than 
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they previously enjoyed taking into account where the company went into 
liquidation.134 
In terms of business rescue proceedings, employees are given rights aimed at 
protecting their employment with the company and are given the opportunity 
of participating in the process. Firstly, as affected persons, both unionised and 
non-unionised employees have a right to bring an application to court for the 
commencement of business rescue proceedings in respect of the company.135 
Consequent to a business rescue application brought by or on behalf of the 
employees, the court in the matter of the Employees of Solar Spectrum Trading 
v Afgri Operations136 held that a plan should not be a prerequisite when 
business rescue applications are instituted by employees, as this would not 
only be unduly onerous but ‘would have the effect of importing a requirement 
that the legislature did not envisage regard being had to the architecture of the 
Act as a whole’.137 The court did not want to impose the plan as an additional 
requirement to an application brought by the employees as this would be more 
onerous than the actual meaning of the Act.  
This appears to be in line with the intention of the legislature that prompted the 
enactment of the business rescue chapter in the Companies Act. Previous 
company restructuring procedures did not cater for employees and debtor-
companies as much as they catered for creditors employees were preferent 
creditors who only received payment when there was residue in the insolvent 
estate after the secured creditors and SARS had been paid. Therefore, for a 
court to recognise this effect and align the business rescue procedures in a 
manner that aims to advance the intentions of the legislature shows a shift in 
the aims of the new company restructuring procedure.  
When making the application for business rescue, the employees have to 
notify the company as well as the shareholders and creditors.138 Once an 
application has been heard and the order for commencing business rescue 
proceedings has been issued, the employees are given a right to be consulted 
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and to participate in the proceedings.139 In terms of section 148 the practitioner 
must convene a meeting with the employees within 10 business days of the 
commencement of business rescue.140 The purpose of the meeting is for the 
practitioner to inform the employees about the results of the preliminary 
investigations and whether the practitioner believes that there is a reasonable 
prospect of rescuing the company. To the extent that the practitioner does not 
believe that the company can be rescued, then he ought to inform the 
employees regarding the possibility and timing of the company being placed 
under liquidation. However, if the practitioner believes that the company can 
be rescued but that there are some changes that will have to happen and those 
changes might affect the contracts of the employees, then the practitioner has 
an obligation to inform the employees as well as the unions they belong to of 
the said changes.141 
In terms of section 136, when a company is under business rescue proceeding 
the terms and conditions of the contract of employment are not altered, they 
remain the same as they were prior to the company being placed under 
business rescue proceedings.142 However, if the company is of the view that it 
needs to retrench some employees in order to be viable and be rescued, then 
it must retrench the employees in accordance with section 189 and 189A of 
the Labour Relations Act No.66 of 1995.143 
The practitioner is obliged to engage with the unions and the non-unionised 
employees in a meaningful manner that aims to provide solutions to the 
possible changes that affect the contract of employment for the employees. 
The agenda of the issues to be discussed during the consultations must further 
be expressed fully so as to avoid confusion between the parties involved.144  
In the matter of Solidarity obo Fourie and Others v Vanchem Vanadium (Pty) 
Ltd and Others, where the practitioner of Vanchem Vanadium retrenched 
employees after the trade unions failed to attend the consultations, the Labour 
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Court held that the unions should have engaged fully with the practitioner and 
that the representatives from the unions failed to report to the unions and their 
members about the issues tabled at the meetings. In this matter, Solidarity 
argued that there were no formal and substantive consultations that took place 
immediately prior to the practitioner deciding to issue a notice of retrenchment 
to the employees.145 Solidarity further argued that the process of engagement 
had been suspended since the parties had referred the matter to CCMA for 
the ‘Training Lay-off Scheme’ to be explored as an alternative to retrenchment. 
As a result, it argued that the retrenchment notices that had been issued by 
the practitioner were not binding on the employees. 
Similarly, NUMSA argued that the practitioner failed to consult with the unions 
and the non-unionised employees regarding payment of the severance pay.146 
According to NUMSA, the proposal by the practitioner that the company 
retracts its commitment to pay the severance pay in terms of its policies was 
never fully discussed by the practitioner and the unions. Further, the issue of 
reemploying some of the employees as part of the restructuring of the 
company was never fully ventilated as the parties were still exploring the 
options provided by section 189A of the LRA, argued NUMSA.147 The union 
also demanded that the practitioner tables the plan as the employees had been 
deprived of their section 189 LRA rights to conduct a meaningful consultation 
with the practitioner.148   
In defending the company, the practitioner stated that the notice of 
retrenchment provided to the employees mentioned that the employees were 
going to be negatively affected by the restructuring of the company as the 
financial state of the company had deteriorated further than initially thought.149 
However, the practitioner conceded that when the consultations with the 
unions and the non-unionised employees took place, nobody had expected 
the company to continue losing business as it did, and that when the decision 
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to retrench the employees was taken, the practitioner did not consult further 
with the unions to inform them about the latest events.150  
In coming to its decision, the labour court held that it was apparent to everyone, 
when the consultations ended, that the practitioner was considering placing 
the company in liquidation proceedings and that the implications of a 
liquidation were obvious to everyone.151 The labour court further mentioned 
that it appeared from the actions of the unions that they had focused too much 
on looking for alternatives that could prevent the complete cessation of the 
production, and on utilising training lay-off scheme that is provided by the 
CCMA even though the CCMA had already refused to entertain this matter.152 
Lastly, the labour court held that ‘if the unions believed that the LRA section 
189A process under the auspices of the CCMA was incomplete, nothing 
prevented them from either trying to extend that formal process or from 
insisting on the conclusion of the consultations under the LRA’s section 189 
on issues which they felt had not been properly canvassed’.153  
In relation to section 136 of the Companies Act which provides the employees 
with a right to be consulted under the provisions of the LRA, NUMSA argued 
that a termination of services of the employees of a company that is in business 
rescue can only be done in terms of an approved plan, and that if there is no 
plan then the termination is unlawful as it contravenes the section 136(1)(a).154 
In applying section 136(1), the labour court used a two-staged approach; the 
first leg of section 136 affirms the continuation of the contract of employment 
for the employees. As such the employees do not cease to continue working 
just by the mere commencement of business rescue proceedings by the 
company.155  
The second leg of section 136(1) of the Act obliges the practitioner to conduct 
retrenchments in the plan in compliance with the relevant provisions of the 
labour laws pertaining to retrenchments. In an obiter the labour court stated 
that the ‘reference to changes occurring in the “ordinary course of attrition” that 
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might be seen as a basis for interpreting the section to provide a guarantee of 
continuity of employment and not merely the preservation of conditions of 
employment’.156 The labour court held that the provisions of section 136 do not 
outlaw retrenchments made by a practitioner of a company that is in business 
rescue outside of a business rescue plan. In this regard, it can be said that 
although employees have been afforded protection by the legislature in terms 
of their agreement they are not completely immune to retrenchments. The right 
of employees not to be retrenched by a practitioner must be weighed against 
the harm that the salaries of employees will cause to the company. It follow 
that companies are not compelled to continue with the employment of its entire 
workforce if it will not be able to sustain itself during business rescue.  
3.2 The ranking of the claim of employees   
Further to the rights provided to employees under sections 128 and 136 of the 
Act, section 144 provides employees with a comprehensive list of how their 
rights should be treated. When a company is under business rescue 
proceedings, any remuneration, monies or reimbursement that it owed to the 
employees becomes due and payable at the commencement of business 
rescue thereof.157 The outstanding payments to the employees entitle them to 
become preferred unsecured creditors of the company.158 The ranking of the 
claim by the employees does not change even if the company is placed in 
liquidation proceedings post business rescue.159  
In Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced 
Technologies and Engineering Company Ltd, the court held that the ranking of 
claims in a business rescue is as follows: first, the remuneration and expenses 
incurred by the practitioner, for costs of business rescue proceedings; second, 
is the remuneration of the employees which became due and payable after the 
business rescue proceedings commenced; third, the repayment to creditors 
that provided PCF to the company; then follows the secured creditors or other 
creditors for any loan or supply made before business rescue proceedings 
began; thereafter comes the claim of employees for any remuneration which 
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became due and payable before business rescue proceedings began; lastly, 
the claims of the unsecured creditors for any loan or supply made to the 
company before business rescue proceedings began.160  
In the event that business rescue proceedings are superseded by liquidation, 
section 135(4) states that the abovementioned ranking stays the same save 
for the costs arising out of the administration of the liquidation proceedings. In 
the matter of Diener NO v Minister of Justice and others, the court held that 
that  
“section 135(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides that if 
business rescue proceedings are superseded by liquidation, the 
preference conferred in terms of section 135 will remain in place, 
except to the extent of any claims arising out of the costs of the 
liquidation. The preferences conferred by the section are clear, and 
include the business rescue practitioner's remuneration. As stated, the 
claim of the practitioner is subject to any claim arising out of the costs 
of liquidation, and only after payment of those claims, will the business 
rescue practitioner's costs be paid, provided the business rescue 
practitioner has proven such claim. Thus, the remuneration of the 
business rescue practitioner and the expenses incurred during 
business rescue proceedings, to the extent that they were not paid 
during the business rescue proceedings and liquidation, can only be 
paid after the costs set out in section 97 of the Insolvency Act have 
been paid”. 161 
As a result, the ranking of the claim by the employees remains protected and 
unchanged. Unlike in a normal liquidation where the claims by the employees’ 
rank as preferent claims in a business rescue the claims of the employees 
enjoy a preferential status above creditors.  
In addition to the preferential status that is given to the claims of the 
employees, employees have a right to vote with creditors on a motion to 
approve the plan and to make submissions to the meetings of holders of voting 
interests.162 To the extent that the employees wish to nominate and appoint a 
committee that will promote their interest during the business rescue 
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proceedings, section 148(1)(b) allows for the employees to have such a 
committee.163 The committee of the employees may consult with the 
practitioner in relation to matters concerning the proceedings, but they may not 
direct or instruct the practitioner.164 Further, the committee can receive reports 
from the practitioner on behalf of the employees and make recommendations 
for the amendment of the plan.165  
3.3 The impact of the rights of employees on a company that is under business 
rescue 
It appears from the above paragraphs that employees have more rights that 
aim to protect their interests in business rescue proceedings than in any other 
company restructuring procedures that are available under company laws. In 
a restructuring procedure that is meant to assist a company in regaining its 
solvency status back, the existence of employees’ rights should also be aimed 
at assisting the company in achieving one of the two aims of business rescue. 
The following sections examine the impact of the employees’ rights in a 
company that is under business rescue proceedings.  
In the matter of the Employees of Solar Spectrum Trading v Afgri Operations, 
the court relaxed the need for affected persons to have a business rescue plan 
when making an application for placing a company in business rescue. As 
seen above, this relaxation is necessary when employees do not have access 
to the financial documents of the company. This relaxation is also beneficial to 
shareholders and creditors who are not closely linked with the company. As a 
result of this relaxation more affected persons are able to make applications to 
the courts for business rescue proceedings without fearing that the 
burdensome requirement will act as a barrier to achieving a much needed aid 
to the company.  
Although the relaxation is to be applied on a case by case basis, the result of 
this is that more affected persons are going to be able to approach courts and 
attempt to save a company before it becomes hopelessly insolvent. The 
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relaxation offered by the courts serves as an encouragement to affected 
persons to act fast and not wait until the company is insolvent before bringing 
a business rescue application. Affected persons will be able to be more 
proactive when dealing with the company financial issues. 
Moreover, unions representing employees are now able to request financial 
statements from the company for the purposes of bringing a business rescue 
application.166 This right further affords employees access to information that 
they would not normally be entitled to have. Therefore, employees, through 
the use of section 31 (4) of the Act, can be able to attach the financial 
statements in support of their business rescue applications. Attaching the 
financial statements in a business rescue application will ensure that the courts 
properly consider the position of the company and that justice for the 
employees and the company is achieved.  
Although the requirement to have a business rescue plan in an application has 
been relaxed as per the case of Solar Spectrum Trading v Afgri Operations, 
the employees could nonetheless use the financial statements provided to the 
unions in the applications as a way to show that the company is financially 
distressed.  
However, it appears from case law that although the right of access to the 
financial statements has been provided to the unions, there has not been any 
union that has used this information for the purposes of launching a business 
rescue application. The unions seem to have taken a reactionary role in 
business rescue proceedings than a proactive role. It is not quite clear why the 
unions tend to adopt this and taking a passive role in the business rescue 
proceedings. This passive role that unions are adopting in proceedings was 
criticised by La Grange J, in the matter of Solidarity obo BD Fourie v Vanchem 
Vanadium (Pty) Ltd, where he expressed his concerns regarding the inactive 
role that NUMSA played in the matter.167 
In relation to the ranking of the claims, it appears from the matter of Diener NO 
v Minister of Justice that the employees are given a preference over some 
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creditors both under business rescue proceedings and in liquidations 
proceedings that have superseded a business rescue.168 The ranking aims to 
align the intention of the legislation for protecting employees in a financial 
restructure of a company with the reality that affects employees when a 
company is restructured. However, this can also be dangerous for a company 
that has a large claim from the employees. If the claims of the employees are 
not possible to be comprised or reduced in terms of sections154 and 155, then 
the company might find itself in a situation where it becomes insolvent when 
assessing the claims of the employees.  
As a result, my view is that the historical claims of the employees against 
companies should be suspended for the duration of business rescue 
proceedings. In this regard, employees will still be paid their salaries as per 
the terms and conditions of their employment contracts; however, if the 
company owes employees for any leave or any other historical payment, then 
payment of that historical claim should be suspended and not be calculated for 
purposes of evaluating the financial status of a company in business rescue. 
Payment of historical claims should be deferred until the company has either 
achieved the primary goal of business rescue or if not achieved, then the 
historical claim will rank in the manner established in the Diener NO v Minister 
of Justice case. 
I further submit that in the event that employees are retrenched as seen in the 
case of Solidarity v Vanchem, then payment of the severance pay should also 
be deferred until the company is able to afford payment of such claims. The 
suspension of both historical claims and severance payments will ensure that 
the company has a healthy balance sheet while it is undergoing business 
rescue and simultaneously not forgetting that it owes such amounts to the 
employees. This approach will further be in line with the LRA requirements 
under sections 189 and 189A thereof in that the employees are not precluded 
from claiming for their severance pay but the company’s obligation to make 
that payment while it is in business rescue is suspended pending the 
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achievement of either the primary goal or will the claim will be accounted for 
under liquidation proceedings.  
Further, both unionised and non-unionised employees have been given rights 
to participate in the process of voting and the approval of the plan.169 This right 
is seen as a very important one for employees and it assists the company by 
ensuring that the employees are aware of the changes within the company and 
the changes that might affect their employment. Also, when employees are 
consulted in the proceedings, they are able to work with the company in 
changing its status from a financially distressed to a financially solvent one. 
The process of involving employees ensures that there is cooperation between 
the company, the employees and the practitioner. The channel of 
communication between the practitioner and the employees is opened.  
Once a plan has been approved everyone within the company works together 
to achieve the common goal of rescuing the company. It further strengthens 
the trust between the practitioner, who is a new person in the company, and 
the employees who have been in the company for a long time, they can all 
work with each other knowing the plans of the company and how the ultimate 
goal can be achieved. It is my view that once employees know exactly what 
the plan is; they are less likely to resist the change in the company’s structure.  
The role that employees play in the rescuing of a financially distressed 
company is an important one. However, more action is needed on both the 
part of the employees and on the unions if companies are going to be rescued. 
The unions must ensure that they are communicating with the practitioner and 
the employees at all times during business rescue. A passive role will only lead 
to the disruption of the communication between the employees, unions and 
practitioner as seen in the matter of Solidarity obo BD Fourie v Vanchem 
Vanadium (Pty) Ltd.  
                                                     




4. The involvement of sureties in business rescue proceedings 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate and analyse the role that sureties play in 
rescuing a company under business rescue proceedings, more specifically 
whether sureties should be liable for payment or performance of the debtor’s 
obligation, when the debtor and creditor have entered into an agreement to 
discharge the claims of the creditors. The analysis will be achieved by looking 
at the nature of suretyships, the importance of a surety in a company, the 
treatment of sureties in chapter 6 of the Companies Act and in business rescue 
proceedings and how the courts have treated the issue of sureties for 
companies under business rescue. 
4.1 The relationship between a company and the surety 
A suretyship contract is an ancillary contract that exists as a result of the main 
agreement being in place. In a contract of a suretyship, the surety assures the 
creditor that if the debtor (for the purposes of the research the debtor is the 
company) defaults on any of the payments or on any of its obligations to the 
creditor, the surety will make the payment or perform the obligation and to the 
extent necessary indemnify the debtor.  Until the surety is called upon to 
perform the obligations of the debtor, there exists no real relationship between 
a surety and the debtor. For all intents and purposes the relationship between 
the debtor and the surety only comes into existence when the surety performs 
obligations on behalf of the debtor. At common law prior to the surety 
performing the obligations, it is merely a contingent creditor of the debtor. 
When the surety is called upon to make payment or to perform the obligation 
of the debtor, it has to inform the debtor about the demand and that it intends 
honouring it.170  
Further, in terms of the common law when the main contract between the 
company and the creditor lapses, automatically the suretyship agreement 
lapses as well.171 Further, where the debt has been compromised or reduced 
between the creditor and the company, the liability of the surety is also reduced 
                                                     




in the same manner as it is accessory to the main debt.172 A suretyship 
agreement is invalid if the main agreement between the company and the 
creditor falls away. Although, suretyships agreements are ordinarily concluded 
after the main agreement has been concluded, it has been held in the matter 
of GA Odendal v Structured Mezzanine Investments (Pty) Ltd 
that suretyship agreements can be concluded before the main contract is 
concluded.173 
The function of suretyships is very important to companies as creditors are 
able to lend companies money and offer to provide services knowing that there 
is a separate security in place which will pay should the company not be able 
to pay. In most instances as will be seen in this chapter, sureties are mainly 
people who are related to the company. Although it is not a requirement that 
sureties be related to the company, creditors tend to have faith in a company 
that has related persons willing to stand as sureties for its debts and/or 
obligations. The issue with sureties, however, emanates when the company 
commences with company restructuring procedures such as business rescue 
and liquidation. As mentioned, the issue as it seems relates to whether sureties 
are liable for payment of the company’s obligations when the company and the 
creditor have decided to either suspend, compromise or reduce the company’s 
obligations in terms of the main agreement.  
As stated above, at common law when the main debt is compromised or 
reduced, the suretyship is also reduced or compromised accordingly.  
However, there are common law principles that creditors employ in order to be 
able to recover money or obligations directly from the surety without having to 
exhaust its options against the company. The aforesaid principle is known as 
the renouncement of the beneficium ordinis seu exussions.174 The 
renouncement of the benefit of excussion means that the surety waives its 
rights to have the creditor attempt to recover the money from the debtor first 
before calling up the suretyship.175 It is my understanding that once the creditor 
calls the suretyship, the surety has to perform the obligation demanded by the 
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creditor. Thereafter, the surety will have a claim against the debtor for the 
performance of the obligation.  
Most suretyship agreements that sureties conclude with financial institutions 
stipulate that the surety renounces the benefit of the excussion and that the 
creditor has the right to call upon the suretyship should the debtor be placed 
in a form of a restructure such as business rescue, liquidation or judicial 
management.176 When faced with a matter regarding a company undergoing 
a restructure, our courts have not always been consistent in their interpretation 
of the principle of suretyship and how the interpretation affects the financial 
position of the company and that of the surety. By way of an example in the 
Tuning Fork v Greeff, the court stated that there is no provision in the new Act 
which states that the moratorium does or does not operate in favour of a surety 
for the distressed company. However, the court in the matter of New Port 
states that the creditor’s ability to sue the surety remains unaffected unless the 
plan itself makes provision for the situation of sureties.177  
To illustrate this, in the matter of Tuning Fork v Greeff, the court held that there 
is no provision in the Companies Act which states that the moratorium does or 
does not operate in favour of a surety for the distressed company.178 This 
statement was overturned in the matter of New Port v Nedbank Ltd wherein 
the court held that the creditor’s ability to sue the surety remains unaffected 
unless the plan itself makes provision for the situation of sureties.179 In this 
instance you have one court denying that there is a provision that deals with 
the liability of sureties while in the other court it is stated that the liability of 
sureties remains unless it is changed in the plan.180   
4.2 The dilemma of the interpretation of section 154 
The problematic area comes when the creditor and the debtor agree to reduce 
or discharge the claim of the creditor without the knowledge of the surety, and 
further require that the surety pays the difference between the reduced amount 
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and the actual initial debt.181 This issue has come before our courts under the 
provision of s154 of the Companies Act which allows for creditors and debtors 
to agree to discharge the claim of the creditor by way of a business rescue 
plan.182 The problem that the agreement between the creditor and the debtor 
creates is that the surety becomes liable to the creditor without actually 
knowing whether or not the debtor is unable to fulfil its obligations under the 
main agreement. 
In an attempt to come to a conclusion regarding the status of sureties and the 
discharged debts, our courts have had competing views on the matter and 
none of them seem to sufficiently address the issue. There appears to be two 
schools of thought when it comes to the interpretation of section 154 of the 
Companies Act and the two competing views are found in the cases of Tuning 
Fork (Pty) Limited v Greeff  and in the case of New Port.    
 Section 154 reads as follows: 
“Discharge of debts and claims (1) A business rescue plan may 
provide that, if it is implemented in accordance with its terms and 
conditions, a creditor who has acceded to the discharge of the whole 
or part of a debt owing to that creditor will lose the right to enforce the 
relevant debt or part of it. 
(2) If a business rescue plan has been approved and implemented in 
accordance with this Chapter, a creditor is not entitled to enforce any 
debt owed by the company immediately before the beginning of the 
business rescue process, except to the extent provided for in the 
business rescue plan.” 
 
According to the commentary in Henochsberg the purpose of section 154 is to 
clarify the position on the discharge of debts and claims against the company 
once a business rescue plan has been adopted and implemented.183 If a plan 
that seeks to compromise or release the company from performing certain 
obligations is approved and implemented, the relevant creditor loses the right 
to later enforce that debt. It does not matter whether that particular creditor 
voted in favour of the plan or against it.184  
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In Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd v Greeff, the court had to decide whether a creditor 
loses its claim against a surety if a duly adopted and implemented business 
rescue plan provides for the creditor’s claim against the principal debtor to be 
compromised in full and final settlement of such claim.185 The defendants in 
this matter were directors of the company, and they had executed suretyship 
agreements in favour of the applicant for the due and punctual payment of the 
debts by the company. The suretyship agreements did not stipulate that the 
claim against the sureties will survive a compromise with the debtor. 
Subsequent to the execution of the suretyship agreements, the company was 
placed under business rescue proceedings, a plan was developed and 
approved by the relevant parties. In terms of the plan, the company had to 
continue trading and service the reduced debts as per approved terms thereof. 
The plaintiff, who was also a creditor of the company, instituted legal 
proceedings against the defendants for the debts of the company. In return, 
the defendants defended the action on the basis, inter alia, that the 
compromise with the principal debtor (the company) released them from 
liability.186  
In his attempt to come to the conclusion Rogers AJ, following an earlier obiter 
dictum that he had mentioned in Investec Bank Limited v De Bruyns,187 stated 
the following:  
“(a) when interpreting section 154, one cannot imply a term that says 
‘creditors’ rights against sureties are or are not unaffected by the 
adoption of a business rescue plan’. The rules of interpretation as 
seen in chapter 1 above, do not allow for the interpretation of a 
statute by reading in provisions that are neither intended nor implied 
in the text. The interpreter has to read in the language that is 
consistent with the text, unless that interpretation will lead to 
absurdity.  However, the court did not view it as necessary to read 
in the aforesaid text onto section 154; 
(b) in respect of the suretyships, it had to apply the general principles 
of the law of suretyship; 
(c) the general principles of the law of suretyship under our common 
law had to be applied in order ‘to determine what effect, if any, the 
provisions contained in any particular business rescue plan have on 
                                                     
185 Op cite 90 at page 1.  
186 Ibid at para 13. 
187 Investec Bank Ltd v De Bruyns op cite 12 at para 20. Rogers AJ states that if the plan is approved 
and implemented with its terms and conditions, an affected creditor may in terms of s154(1) lose the 
right to enforce its claim. I am prepared to assume in the defendant’s favour if all of these events 
were to occur a surety for the company would not be liable to the creditor for more than so much of 
the claim as survives the implementation of the plan.   
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sureties’. It appears from the chapter 6 of the Companies Act that 
sureties are not catered for by the Act. The only time chapter 6 
makes provision for sureties, is when the company itself stood as 
surety for someone else, and this is found under section 133(2) of 
the Act; 
(d) as seen above, one of the principles of suretyships is that when the 
debt is discharged by a compromise between the debtor and the 
creditor, the surety is also discharged unless the surety has 
renounced the benefit of excussion. In this matter the suretyship did 
not provide for the renouncement of the benefit of excussion by the 
surety. The general principle of the benefit of excussion ‘also 
applies to a compromise or release pursuant to a statute, regardless 
of whether or not the creditor supported the compromise or release’. 
The suretyship concluded by the defendants did not exclude the 
application of the law in this regard; 
(e)  ‘if a business rescue plan provides for the discharge of the principal 
debt by way of a release of the principal debtor, and the claim 
against the surety is not preserved by such stipulations in the plan 
as may be legally permissible, the surety is discharged’. This 
reasoning by the court is in line with the nature of the suretyship in 
that it is accessory to the debt; its existence is directly related to the 
existence of the debt; and 
(f) lastly, the ‘business rescue plan in this matter was construed as one 
by which the company had been discharged from its liability and 
since the liability of the sureties was not addressed in the plan, the 
liability of the defendants was also discharged’  through the use of 
common principle of the accessory nature of the suretyship.”188 
It appears from the reasoning of Rogers AJ that, absent a regulatory clause in 
the suretyship agreement, the common law principles of suretyship will apply, 
and when the performance of obligations by a debtor have been discharged in 
terms of a plan the liability of the surety will also be discharged. The application 
of the common law principles is a result of the lack of provision for sureties in 
the Companies Act by the legislature. Upon analysing the judgment of Rogers 
AJ, one can see that creditors to companies under business rescue have to 
regulate the issue of compromise in the suretyship agreements and not wait 
for the plan. This however, only solves half of the problem, as the sureties are 
deprived of their rights to check whether or not the debtor is in fact unable to 
perform the obligation and not just that it has chosen not to perform the 
obligation.  
Further, if this reasoning is followed, and the creditors regulate the liability of 
the sureties through the clauses of the suretyship agreement, and the liability 
                                                     
188 Ibid at para 14.  
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of the debtor is discharged in the plan; the company is at risk of having to 
perform the obligation despite having discharged the obligation with the 
creditor.  This happens when the surety has performed the obligation of the 
debtor in favour of the creditor and returns to the debtor to claim for the 
performance as entitled by common law. If the debtor and creditor decide to 
compromise the creditor’s claim without the knowledge of the surety, the surety 
has recourse against the debtor for the performance once it has performed in 
terms of the suretyship.  
However, when a company has been placed under business rescue and has 
compromised the claim of a creditor in terms of an approved plan, then the 
surety is at risk of not being able to exercise the right of recourse against a 
company that is still under business rescue. Once a plan has been adopted 
and implemented, it cannot be adjusted. There is no provision in the 
Companies Act that enables any of the affected persons to attack an approved 
plan.  
In order to illustrate the shortcomings of section 154 as indicated above, the 
following example is made: Company A owes five million rand to Creditor C 
and due to not satisfying the insolvency test, Company A is placed under 
business rescue; Company A and Creditor C agree by way of an approved 
plan that the claim of Creditor C will be reduced to three million rand; Company 
A pays three million rand to Creditor C; Creditor C then goes to Company B, 
which stood as surety for the debts of Company A in favour of Creditor C, and 
demands that Company B makes payment of the shortfall in the amount of two 
million rand; and Company B pays the shortfall amount to Creditor C . In terms 
of the law of suretyships, Company B now has a right of recourse against 
Company A, however, since Company A is under business rescue, the right of 
recourse can only be exercised with the consent of the practitioner or upon an 
application to court. Once Company B is permitted to lodge its right of recourse 
against Company A, Company A will effectively be in the same position it was 
in prior to concluding a compromise with Creditor C. This position is one where 
Company A continues to owe an amount of five million rand despite having 
made a compromise with Creditor C. The compromise that is made under 
section154 does not benefit the company in any way. It merely just provides 
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the creditor with more than one way of recovering its claim, for instance a part 
of the debt is recovered from the company while the rest is recovered from the 
surety.   
Effectively, section 154, which is a provision that was meant to assist the 
company in reducing claims of creditors is, in practice, a dormant provision 
that does not meaningfully solve the financial problems of the company that it 
might have been enacted to solve.  
Although this issue was raised in the Investec Bank Ltd v De Bruyns, Rogers 
AJ dismissed it without actually considering the effects and the uncertainty that 
comes with leaving this section without a meaningful interpretation.189 This fails 
to consider the fact that the financial status of the company is directly affected 
by the amount it owes to its debtors. When a debt that was compromised to 
R0 with the creditor suddenly becomes R100 at the hands of the surety, the 
financial status of the company changes from solvent to insolvent and this 
could mean the difference between companies surviving business rescue and 
companies being placed in liquidation after the assessment by the practitioner.  
With all due respect, the reasoning of Rogers AJ, creates a substituted creditor 
in the form of the surety without providing the company that is in actual financial 
distress with any meaningful relief. The lack of provision for the position of 
sureties in business rescue proceedings is dangerous for the company in as 
far as the financial status of the company is concerned.  
There are matters where the liability of the sureties is regulated in the 
suretyship agreements as well as in the plan. However, the regulation thereof 
does not always mean that the creditor will lose its right to enforce its claim 
against the surety. In adopting the reasoning of Rogers AJ the court in the 
matter of Absa Bank Limited v Du Toit and Others, held that where the plan 
stipulates that the payment to the creditor in terms thereof is the ‘full and final 
settlement of all of the creditor’s debts’, the creditor does not have a right to 
enforce the remaining part of the claim against the sureties.190 In the aforesaid 
                                                     
189 Investec Bank Ltd v De Bruyns op cite 12 at para 22 and 23 Rogers AJ, states ‘if the 
creditor were to recover from the surety in full, the right to consider a compromise against 
the principal debtor would pass to the surety because the creditor would fall out of the picture 
and the surety would take the creditor’s place by virtue of his right of recourse against the 
principal debtor…Even if this were so, I do not see how this could affect the position.’ 
190 Absa Bank Limited v Du Toit and Others [2013] ZAWCHC 194 at para 19. 
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matter, the suretyship agreement had stipulated that the liability of the sureties 
will not be extinguished by any compromise between the creditor and the 
principal debtor.191 However, when the approved plan states that the amount 
to be paid by the company under business rescue is the ‘full and final 
settlement of the creditor’s claim’, the clauses of the plan overrode the clauses 
of the suretyship agreement. The matter of Absa Bank Limited v Du Toit  and 
Others is proof that the reasoning of Rogers AJ in the matter of Tuning Fork 
(Pty) Ltd v Greeff does not sufficiently address the issue of sureties and their 
liability to creditors and that any regulation thereof must be provided for by the 
legislature.  
If the reasoning in the Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd v Greeff matter is followed together 
with that of the Absa matter, then creditors will be hesitant to accept persons 
standing as surety for the debts of companies as these tend to be useless 
when companies are placed in business rescue. Creditors play an important 
role to companies and sureties help secure credit where companies would not 
have been granted same. To say that the business rescue plan once approved 
and implemented in the terms set out in the matter of Absa Bank Limited v Du 
Toit and Others, prevents creditors from enforcing their claims against sureties 
is to undermine the very nature of suretyships.192 In the aforesaid matter the 
surety was able to raise a defence that the claim of the creditor against him 
was extinguished by the fact that the business rescue plan stipulated that the 
pay out to the creditor was in full and final settlement of its claims, and stated 
that this provision also applied in respect of the claim of the creditor against 
the surety.  
It is important to recognise the importance of sureties as well as the critical role 
that creditors play in the life of companies. Financial institutions and other 
financial services providers lend credit to companies with a hope that they will 
get it back, and if the company is unable to pay all of it, then the surety will be 
liable for the shortfall.  
In my view the result of the ruling in the Absa Bank Limited v Du Toit and 
Others matter creates a negative domino effect on the creditors of the 
                                                     
191 Ibid at para 13. 
192 Op cite 145. 
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company; if the claim against the company and the claim against the sureties 
are both limited to a specific low figure, then the creditor risks being 
insolvent.193 There exists a real possibility that the creditors could also be 
placed under business rescue or in liquidation as a result of the compromised 
claims in terms of the plan for the company.  
In my view it is unfair on the creditor concerned to be expected to take a 
compromise on its claim against the company so the company can pay other 
creditors at the expense of a single creditor.194 The other school of thought can 
be found in the judgment of the New Port Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v 
Nedbank Ltd matter. In this case, the SCA held that section 154(1) should be 
interpreted to mean ‘that in certain circumstances a creditor will not be able to 
enforce a debt against a company in business rescue’ and, section 154(2) 
should be interpreted to mean ‘that the company may enforce a debt in 
accordance with and to the extent permitted by the terms of the business 
rescue plan’.195  
The SCA further held that section 154 is capable of the construction that it 
deals only with the ability to sue the principal debtor and not with the existence 
of the debt itself and that if that is the case then the liability of the surety would 
be unaffected by the business rescue, unless the plan itself made specific 
provision for the situation of sureties.196 It appears from the aforesaid quote 
from the SCA that again the regulation of the liability of the sureties is placed 
on the plan that must be approved by creditors, the same creditors who are 
only interested in recovering their claims. This reasoning fails to consider the 
fact that sureties are not party to the business rescue process as they are not 
affected persons in terms of the Act.197 Sureties do not have any person 
representing their interests during the discussions surrounding the plan. 
Therefore, any judgment that places the fate of sureties in the plan is a flawed 
judgment.198  
                                                     
193 Ibid. 
194 Kritzinger and another v Standard Bank of South Africa [2014] JOL 32603 (FB) para 55. 
195 New Port Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v Nedbank Ltd [2014] ZASCA 210 para 14. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Stan Rio Pipe and Steel (Pty) Ltd v Esterhuizen [2016] ZAGPPHC 35 at para 11. 
198 Ibid.  
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In the New Port v Nedbank Ltd matter, New Port and another had stood as 
sureties for companies that had been placed under business rescue. While the 
companies were defaulting on their payments to Nedbank Ltd, Nedbank Ltd 
instituted action proceedings and obtained default judgments against the 
companies, New Port and the other surety. The liability of the sureties to 
Nedbank Ltd had been fixed by the judgment.199  
As a result of the judgment that had been obtained against the sureties, the 
settlement in terms of the business rescue plan in respect of the indebtedness 
of the company did not alter the liability of the sureties to Nedbank Ltd.200 The 
nature and extent of the liability in terms of the suretyships had been 
established. In terms of section 154(1) of the Act, the plan must have been 
approved and implemented, the issue with the argument of New Port is, inter 
alia, that the plan in respect of the companies in business rescue had failed.201 
Further, it was stated that any compromise made between the companies and 
Nedbank Ltd would never have an effect on the liability of the sureties as the 
suretyship agreements and the judgment bound the sureties and companies 
to be jointly and severally liable for the debt to Nedbank.202  
The judgment could be interpreted to mean that once judgment has been given 
in respect of the liability of sureties, the sureties will have to honour it and only 
hope to recover from the company in terms of their right of recourse. However, 
when there is a plan that does not cater for the contingent liability of the 
sureties in terms of the judgments, the sureties are again left without any 
proper recourse. If this position remains as the ratio to be followed, then 
companies are at risk of losing persons who will stand as sureties in favour of 
creditors. This is because sureties will be weary of the repercussions such as 
liquidations and sequestrations applications that could follow as a result of the 
main debtor entering into compromise with the creditor to the disadvantage of 
sureties.  
Interestingly, in the matter of De Beer NO v First Rand Bank Limited the 
sureties were allowed to bring an interdict against the company in order to 
                                                     
199 Ibid at para 9.  
200 Ibid at para 11. 
201 Companies Act 2008 s154(1). 
202 Op cite 103 at para 9. 
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safeguard the property that forms part of the security to which the liability of 
the sureties attached.203 The learned judge held that this must be so because 
where the assets of one entity are defrayed, that has the effect of devaluing 
the estate of that particular entity, consequently increasing the exposure of the 
sureties.204  
The aforesaid matter directly addresses the issue of section 154. It provides a 
meaningful safeguard to sureties for companies under business rescue in that 
they can apply to court if the company intends on selling the property that will 
increase the exposure to creditors. This approach looks at the interests of both 
the company and sureties in that both must be protected and be held 
accountable where it is necessary. However, due to technical errors with the 
procedural requirements the matter was struck-off the roll, nonetheless it is 
argued that the principle from this matter can be adopted to assist in the 
interpretation of section 154 to enable it to have the impact that the legislature 
had intended.205   
Arguably, the different interests of the parties involved must be considered fully 
and there should not be a party that is forced or coerced to assist a financially 
distressed company. It might well be important that companies are afforded 
some breathing space, compromises and post commencement funding where 
it is necessary to do so; however, none of the other parties should be exposed 
to financial dangers as a result thereof. Creditors, sureties and other people 
who have provided some form of security to creditors for the debts of the 
company should be afforded an opportunity to present their proposals in the 
business rescue plan. And the only way that this can be done is if the definition 
of ‘affected persons’ in section 128 is amended to include sureties and other 
security providers for the company. The Act needs to empower these people 
with a meaningful role to play in the company’s restructuring process. As seen 
in De Beer v First Rand Bank, sureties need to assume an active role in the 
company so that they can protect the assets of the company for which their 
security is based.206  
                                                     
203 De Beer NO v First Rand Bank Limited 2015 JDR 2266 (GP) para 16. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid at para 18.  
206 Op cite 109.  
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This will effectively ensure that companies are always trading solvent as the 
sureties will have a direct and material interest in the company. Also, in similar 
way as unions can request the financial statements of a company for the 
purposes of instituting business rescue proceedings, sureties should also be 
afforded this right. If sureties are provided with meaningful rights in respect of 
the company, the company has a better chance of being rescued as sureties 
can institute business rescue proceedings well before the company becomes 
insolvent.  
Although some people might view this as interfering with the control of the 
company; however, as seen in chapter 2 above under the trade unions, the 
right to access to financial statements for the commencement of business 
rescue has been frequently invoked and there is no evidence to say that the 
sureties will abuse this right if it were to be provided to them.  Therefore, as a 
way of ensuring that the company is successfully rescued, there is a need for 
all stakeholders including sureties, to all be involved in the approval and 
implementation of the plan, this will ensure that all parties work together with 
a common goal of assisting the company knowing that if the plan fails then 
there are going to be serious repercussions on everyone. As mentioned this 
can be achieved by amending the definition of ‘affected persons’ in section 128 
and by affording sureties similar rights such as the right to participate in the 
voting and approval of the plan and the right to institute business rescue 
proceedings.  
Business rescue proceedings have two objectives: one which is aimed at 
rescuing the company, as discussed above; and the second objective is aimed 
at providing a better return for the creditors or shareholders than would result 
from the immediate liquidation of a company. The role and rights of sureties of 
a company that is in business rescue has been discussed above; however, in 
the event that the status of the company worsens and the company is 
liquidated, one wonders what will happen to the rights of the sureties in this 
regard. Sureties to a company that is in liquidation are at risk of having to 
honour their agreements in favour of creditors. In the event that the company 
does not have sufficient assets to discharge its full indebtedness to the 
creditor, then the sureties will be liable for the shortfall thereof.  
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However, to the extent that there is another security in the form of property that 
a creditor can use to reduce the indebtedness of the company, this will be done 
first as secured creditors are paid out in accordance with the liquidation and 
distribution account in terms of section 89 of the Administration of Insolvent 
Estates Act.207 This is important for sureties as in this event they can only be 
liable to that specific creditor for only the remaining part of the debt. Unlike in 
business rescue proceedings, where a creditor in agreement with the debtor 
can choose to immediately discharge the claim of the creditor against the 
debtor in hope to recover the full amount from the surety; it is better for the 
creditor to first obtain its share in terms of the liquidation and distribution 
account prior to instituting proceedings against the surety.  
However, should the creditor first recover its debt from the sureties, the 
sureties are not barred from proving their claim against the company.208 Unlike 
in business rescue proceedings where the sureties are unable to prove their 
claim once the plan has been approved and implemented, in liquidation 
proceedings claimants can lodge their claims at either the first or second 
meeting of creditors.209 To the extent that the claims were not lodged in the 
aforesaid meetings, they can request that the liquidator convenes a special 
meeting for the purposes of lodging of the claim by the surety.  
Further, in the event that the surety is not happy with the manner in which the 
liquidator has drawn the liquidation and distribution account, the surety can 
lodge a complaint with the Master of the High Court and request that the 
account be amended.210 Lastly, unlike in business rescue proceedings where 
there is a moratorium that applies on legal proceedings instituted against the 
company, liquidation proceedings do not have a similar protection. It is my 
understanding that claimants can institute legal proceedings against a 
company that is in liquidation if their claims have not been accepted by the 
liquidators and request that the courts access the claim and direct the liquidator 
to approve the claim. 
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This appears to be a gross oversight on the part of the legislature to provide 
sureties to companies in business rescue with no rights whereas in liquidation 
proceedings that actually compete with business rescue proceedings, where 
sureties have avenues in which to recover some of their money from the debtor 
company. This is a problem as it provides sureties with reasons to oppose 
business rescue applications that appear not to cater for their interests. From 
the point of view of a surety it is better to have a company liquidated than 
placed under business rescue proceedings as there are more chances of 





Chapter 5  
5. Conclusion and recommendations 
The aim of the minor dissertation was to analyse the rights that affected 
persons are provided with in terms of the Act as well as the manner in which 
those rights are exercised. The minor dissertation further scrutinised the 
definition of ‘affected persons’ by looking at the provisions of the Act and 
seeing whether or not the current definition is sufficient to cover all persons 
who are affected when a company is placed under business rescue. 
The rights of affected persons were looked at in light of the interpretation that 
has been attributed to them by our courts. In respect of the shareholders, it 
became apparent in the analysis that the rights provided to shareholders are 
not enough to render them useful for the purposes of rescuing a company. In 
this regard, I took issue with the fact that only the shareholders whose 
shareholding is being altered are given the rights to participate in the 
discussions regarding the business rescue plan. In my view, which is stipulated 
above, shareholders irrespective of the status of their shareholding should be 
in a position to discuss the plan with all the other stakeholders.  
Further, I also realised that although some shareholders are allowed to 
participate in the discussions regarding the plan, they are only allowed to 
propose amendments to the plan. Unlike the other affected persons who are 
able to vote in favour or against the plan, shareholders are not provided with 
this right. In this regard, I propose that the rights of the shareholders be 
amended to include all shareholders in the business rescue proceedings, and 
that the shareholders whose shareholding is going to be altered be allowed to 
vote on the plan. These amendments can be effected by the legislature. In this 
regard, I would propose that the Act is referred back to the legislature for 
amending. 
In regard to the rights provided to creditors, I found that creditors to the 
company in business rescue are afforded sufficient rights to enable them to 
have a meaningful participation in the business rescue proceedings. Further, 
it is my view that the provisions of the business rescue chapter have to a larger 
degree achieved the purpose of which they were intended. In this regard, I 
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compared the rights that creditors have under the liquidation proceedings 
against the rights they have in business rescue proceedings: in my analysis I 
realised that the business rescue provisions are not as creditor-friendly as the 
liquidation proceedings. The provisions create an equilibrium between the 
rights of the company and those of creditors. The moratorium that applies in 
respect of the claims of creditors shifts the power from creditors to the debtor-
company and then the creditors’ rights to vote in favour or against the plan 
restricts the application of the moratorium in the hands of the company. As 
such, the parties are compelled to negotiate in good faith and come to a 
solution that is amicable to both parties, even in situations where the debtor-
company is liquidated in terms of the secondary aim of business rescue. 
In relation to the employees of the company under business rescue, I found 
their rights to be overreaching. In this regard, the rights afforded to the 
employees are wide and they tend to protect the employees to the detriment 
of the company in business rescue. I looked at the rights of the employees to 
claim their severance payments when a company is placed in business rescue. 
I found this to be financially strenuous on a company that is already financially 
destressed. It is understandable that employees have a right to their salaries 
and outstanding payments. However, when a company is placed under 
business rescue it is highly unlikely that it will be able to afford paying salaries 
that are in arrears. As a result thereof, I suggest that the outstanding salaries 
be noted in the plan, however, payment thereof should be suspended until the 
company is able to pay for it or have super-preferential treatment if the 
company is liquidated after being placed under business rescue.  
In relation to the definition of affected persons, it is my view that the current 
definition is insufficient as it does not cater for every person that is linked to 
the company under business rescue. In this regard, I suggested that the 
definition of affected persons be amended to include sureties as these are 
some of the people who suffer the most when companies are placed under 
forms of restructuring. My reasons for suggesting the amendment were formed 
by looking at the interpretation of section 154 that has been given by different 
courts. In this regard, I looked at different case law and stated how each case 
fails to adequately provide sureties with protection from abuse by the company 
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and creditors. Currently, companies under business rescue are able to use the 
sureties as scapegoats for performing obligations in favour of the creditors 
while knowing very well that sureties will not be able to use their rights of 
recourse against the company while it is under business rescue.  
Further, sureties are also receiving abuse from creditors who do not wish to 
partake in the business rescue proceedings of the debtor company. As such, 
I recommend that the definition of affected persons be amended to include 
sureties and that sureties be given rights to participate in the discussions 
regarding the plan since they stand to be materially affected by the outcome 
of the plan. As it stands, chapter 6 of the Companies Act should be amended 
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